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I. Cultural boundaries in South Africa
In this paper, I am making a number of claims about the potentials of boundaries.
The argument can be stated in the following several sentences.
Boundaries are created and maintained by cultural conventions, and boundaries
constitute a kind of social and cultural 'edge', or set of edges. South Africa can be
characterised as a country full of boundaries or social edges. As a polity, it is
perplexed by overlapping and shifting identities that have been created by multiple
historical processes. These have left a complex pattern of social and cultural edges.
One kind of boundary that is especially important in understanding South Africa is the
boundaries of the country. South Africa is a country, not a nation, and it is composed
of three city states and their hinterlands. Being a citizen of a country, rather than a
member of a nation or subject of a king (Zulu or English), has implications for a
number of other identities. In particular, the sense of belonging to a country arises
from an identification with its landscape, but possibly also with the land, the soil or
the earth, since countries, but not nations or states, are understood to be parts of the
earth's surface, or of the land and landscape. This rasises the possibility of a struggle
over autochthony and autochthnous origins. Authochthony is the idea of an origin
from the earth or of an identity based on images of emergence from the soil. The
South African historical struggle for a South African identity is largely focussed on a
struggle for autochthonous rights and identities. This has created a country of political
actors who are much more aware of the nature and the limits of the polity, or of
multiple polities in the larger political arena of the country. The peculiar character of
southern African politics is due to the fact that it is largely a meta-politics, that is, it is
a form of politics that focusses attention on the nature of politics itself and the on the
limits of political identity and participation.
II. Boundaries and culture
In a 1988 essay on 'culture', I wrote about how cultures define boundaries.2 My
claim then was that one of the chief functions of culture was to invent, to maintain and
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sometimes to impose boundaries. At that time, the essay was partly intended as a
critique of the theories of culture that seemed to underwrite the policy of Apartheid.
That essay has since found a wide and appreciative audience in South Africa, but a
boundary has been crossed into a New South Africa and the terms of the debate have
changed. My goal in the essay was to move towards a definition of culture that
transcended ethnic and partisan boundaries. I saw boundaries as being central to the
function of political culture in particular, but pointed to the paradox that this
formulation presented. If cultures helped people to define their identities, and thus to
create boundaries, then there must be 'culture' on both sides of any boundary. In other
words that which divided people also united them in a strange way, 'This idea seemed
to be especially valuable for South Africa, and 1 attempted to define culture as a sort of
'community resource' or set of resources available in principle to all people in South
Africa. I argued then, against the Apartheid view of separate and incommensurable
cultures, that South African culture had some regional coherence, but often very little
logical coherence.3 By attempting to define boundaries as cultural products, I
intended to historicise them as human creations that, like any other powerful fiction or
myth, had an historical beginning and could have an end.
I would make the surprising claim, based on this reasoning, that South Africa is
particularly suseptible to democratic forms of political activity, but that the limits and
scope of participation in the polity of the coumty will always remain problematic. It is
susceptible to democracy because democracy is not actually a form of government at
all, but rather a method for choosing powerful political agents who will act on behalf
of others. These actors, and their constituents can, of course, choose to be ruled by
tyrants, and sometimes do. Democracy, therefore, unlike many other forms of
government, is unable to guarantee its own future. The overlapping identities and the
plethora of social edges in southern Africa, however, will tend to maintain a meta-
politics — a politics about politics — and democracy is always likely to emerge and re-
emerge out of this. I believe that the history of South Africa supports this claim, but in
this paper I examine and elaborate on the claims that I have made about southern
Africa's special political character. • "•"'-' : '''
A. A theory of the social edge
It is now dear to me that what is needed now is an integrated theory of historical
and cultural 'edges', points of transition between identities, categories, regions and
historical periods. This image of the edge evokes for me an idea of a transition point
between planes, flat surfaces that can symbolize, like a map, relatively coherent cultural
" "Culture: A Contemporary Definition" la South African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of
Political Concepts. (Edited by Emile Boonzaier and John Sharp, Cape Town: David Philip 1988.) pp
17-28.
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. In defining culture in this way, I was attempting to blend a Boasian view that cultures have
regional distributions, in the manner of his 'age-area' hypothesis. Boas saw little logical coherence,
where European theories of culture emphasized the logical coherence or structure and function of
culture. The problem that 1 saw what how to integrate a regional view of culture (after Boas) with a
holistic theory' of culture that saw separate cultures as internally consistent but regionally
incommensurable (after Malinowski and Durkheim).
discourses or spatial regions or both. The edge is a point of transition and intersection
that is shared by two planes. An edge is part of both planes, but it is seen as part of
neither. I believe that South Africa has long been a region full of cultural, historical
and regional edges, like a finely cut diamond, perhaps. It has also had an acute vision
of its own historical edges, and of the edges of its many 'parts'. Moreover, this
constant vision of the edges of social, cultural, regional and historical categories has
driven South African history in its own characteristic way. For instance, the 'edge' of
the urban environment, and the edge of the rural have been eroding each other for
most of this century. The rural-urban edge is now more like a continuous curve, but
people continue to insist on the maintenance of this edge. The maintenance of this
boundary, and the use of it to symbolize many other sorts of transitions and
boundaries, is integral to African Independent churches, for instance, which seek to
mediate between images of urban evil and rural peace. The migrant who attempts to
maintain a family in the rural areas while he works in the urban mines and industry,
both transcends these edges while maintaining, even insisting upon, the distinction
between urban work and subjugation counterpoised against rural rest and dignity. The
White Afrikaner who longs of iheplaas ['farm' or 'rural area' ]', or the volkstaat
[literally 'folk state'] does the same. For black,South Africans, the boundaries
between youth and age are .constantly transgressed, especially since the Soweto
Uprising and Sharpeville when youth took charge of the 'revolution', but also
constantly maintained through periodic renaissance of initiation rituals and
circumcision.
 :;: ,-;;..•
:, These social and historical edges distinguish and characterize South African society
and history. It is possible to see the history of migrancy, for instance, as an ongoing
discourse about the edges of the rural and the urban, the male and the female, between
alienating labour and fulfilling work, between black and white, between money,
markets and commodities on the one hand and gifts, family and the wholesomeness of
the land on the other. These potentials of cultural and regional boundaries have yet to
be thoroughly explored, but they do have genuine historical force.
Throughout Africa, contemporary discussion of a potential transition from colonial
and post-colonial authoritarian states to new multi-party democratic orders tends to
assume that the fundamental cultural concepts and practices of African polities will
support such a change. Some recent sociology, social history and ethnographic work
on European revolutions and transition to the Modem, however, points strongly
towards the importance of cultural notions which African societies and cultures appear
to lack. For instance, notions of privacy and institutions which support the practices
and the architecture of privacy, the control (but not absence) of violence and coercive
intrusion, an apparently distinctive European concept of the person and of
individualism and individuality, and so on, while deeply embedded in European
cultures are often less apparent or absent in African. On the other hand, small-scale
democracies of the African village-chiefs public court has no obvious equivalent in
contemporary Europe. It is essential now to examine how these ideas of boundaries
defining privacy, the public, the battlefield, etc. — boundaries of persons, boundaries
of kin-group, in-group, out-group, of friend and enemy, of the familiar and the stranger
— are understood, negotiated and redefined in Africa. This is equally a problem for
studies of real (i.e. empirical) polities and action, as it is for the 'imagined
communities' of nationalism and race. While boundaries are often seen as the locus of
political conflict, it is also clear that boundaries are essential for there to be any politics
at all. What is less clear is how the idea of personal, political, cultural, regional and
other boundaries either contribute towards or militates against a particular political'
order. The recent history of southern African politics needs to be understood in the
context of broader theoretical discussions from anthropology and social history of the
boundaries that define the person, the domains of'public' and 'private', and the polity
(as the arena of conflict and negotiations, and as the space of political power). In '
doing so, we must examine in particular how different cultural constructions of
boundaries of person and polity have been deployed in southern African politics from
the late nineteenth century to the present."
By 1988, however, it looked to many of us in South Africa that the end of
Apartheid, and perhaps more besides, was at hand. But the vision of the end of South
Africa and the end Apartheid was perennial: everyone knew it must happen, but no one
was ever really ready for it. For decades, even centuries, South Africans have lived as
if on the edge of a political Apocalypse, believed to be the edge of history and of
civilization, both fearing it and desiring it as one kind of liberation or another. Shortly
before I wrote the essay on culture, the State President, Mr. P. W. Botha had had a
vision of that historical edge. In a speech to the public, he called it 'the Rubicon' with
obvious reference to small stream that Julius Caesar crossed in AD 49. Although
'crossing the Rubicon' has come to mean irrevocable commitment to a course of
action, Botha proved unable to cross the historical edge, but P. W. Botha did set in
motion, almost unwittingly, a process that led to the collapse of his government, and
ultimately to the release of Nelson Mandela and the first democratic elections in 1994.
Now, a few months after the first universal-franchise democratic elections in South
Africa, the country is poised on a new edge. This time it is the edge of the future. The
ambient political rhetoric now presents South Africa and its President, Nelson
Mandela, as the best shot at secular salvation we've got. A history of oppression and
separateness has suddenly given way to what looks like a future of opportunity under a
government of National unity. An edge has been crossed. New edges have been
created and a whole new map of South Africa has been drawn that cross-cuts most of
the old provinces that were based on the boundaries of older states and colonies. New
ethnicities and political identities are emerging while old ones change and adapt to the
new political geometry.
B. Boundaries as edges of difference
Boundaries are lines of distinction or difference between the different parts of the
polity. Boundaries exist in many different forms, but they have in common some
symbolic means of marking difference and inclusion or exclusion from some category.
Simple difference itself— difference of language, religion, believes, practices, colour,
and so on —is never to sufficient to make a social or cultural difference. There must
also be a concept of a category that some difference — any difference — can be made
to mark. Not all socially relevant differences are marked by cultural or social
differences. The magical appeal of Calvinism, for instance, was that the real and most
essential difference between people was not marked in any perceptible way. Whether
one was saved or not was only known to god, but the boundaries that the distinction
created were believed to be both absolute and final. Being saved or damned, of
course, consisted purely and simply of a difference that only God could know and
comprehend. This in turn created two categories of people which was based on what
we might call pure difference: pure because it could not be confused with any human
judgment. This was because no mortal could perceive the such a fundamental
difference. Outside the circle of believers in this pure form of difference, however,
there literally was no difference. The moral of this story — although there are others,
notably the one Max Weber drew out of it — is that the signs of difference are never
either a necessary or a sufficient condition for the existence of socially relevant
difference. In broadly anthropological terms, then, social difference is ultimately a
matter of categories which signs such as colour, practices, or whatever, may
symbolize.4 The symbols and markers of difference then must be cultural just as the
capacity to form concepts must be a universal human trait. Together, categories and
concepts make it possible to communicate. One of the things we humans most
urgently communicate about, it seems, is difference.
In this sense, then, I said at the very end of the essay, that
Societies, political groups, nations and so on have boundaries. Their edges
are often very easy to perceive and to define. This is what culture does.
But the boundaries that are created . . . are at the centre of culture, not its
edges.5
I meant by this that the means for cultural communication in the many forms that it
takes — from popular culture to official culture, high culture, business culture,
political culture or whatever — tend to make the edges of social groupings as clear as
possible through all of the symbolic and communicative means at its disposal. The
edges of social groups come into being when cultures recognize common symbols of
difference. This includes ritual, religion, rites of passage, a literature, secular and
sacred law, monuments, political oratory and recruitment, etc. Elaborating on this
recognition has been at the centre of major theoretical efforts of, for instance, Pierre
Bourdieu or Jurgen Habermas.
In 1988, South Africa was still struggling with Apartheid. It seemed to me then, as
it seems to me now, that Apartheid was an attempt to make hard edges where there
were only ragged imbrications of fragmented societies. Formulated by intellectuals,
albeit twisted ones, Apartheid was as much an intellectual exercise of making order
out of what was widely perceived to be chaos, as it was a political plan, or the
consequence of grand economic structures of determination. It was a desperate
attempt to create and to maintain boundaries that were clear and sharp in a country
4
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where there were none, or where those that did exist overlapped and confused any
attempt to grasp it all. Apartheid's vision was to create an order that could be
grasped, a whole that could be taken in at a glance, a machine that would glint and
shine as the light of history reflected off its clear sharp edges. There was a clear
aesthetic judgment of the kind of social life that would be deemed wholesome. That
vision — the Vision of the Apartheid visionaries, was of a social mass with edges,
crystalline rather than liquid. In reading the documents that these visionaries
produced, one has the feeling that they longed for the imagined political feel of glazed
tiles and porcelain, rather than the slippery mud of rain washed soil or blowing dust. It
was in its essence a modern feel that they wanted, enamel on metal, one that would
endure, and be made pure. Instead, the southern part of Africa had long felt like it was
always at the end of its own history, always about to combust from the friction of its
peoples. For the architects of Apartheid, edges meant order. The plan was quite
simply to create edges where they had not existed before, and to sharpen up the
definition of those that existed. This process of differentiation is familiar enough to
anyone familiar with South African history. I merely wish to point to the aesthetic
vision that was implicit in it, and its family resemblance to other projects of
modernism, from Betty Crocker and the all-electric kitchen to Hitler's crematoriums.
The symbols of difference served intellectual and cultural programs that created
boundaries and appreciated, above all, the aesthetics of the hard edge.
This is, in a sense, natural. The symbolic modes of human imagination, expression
and memory tend to create categories whose edges are hard and certain rather than
soft and fuzzy. Indeed the idea of fuzzy categories and soft concepts (such as those of
the social sciences and humanities) have been consistently devalued by the academy
and by the public. Nevertheless, it is now asserted from within schools of so-called
post-modernism and 'chaos theory', that fuzzy and soft is what its all about. Life, for
the most part, is really quite fuzzy, except where it is hard, and it is the hall-mark of
reason, and the key to the growth of science to find the hard edges of fact and
invariable regularity that lurk in the fuzzy experience of everyday life and the chaos of
nature. Chaos, according to one new kind of mathematics, may be determined by
relatively simple forces and causes that can be represented by relatively simple
mathematical formulae. Most forms of chaos are not fully or even partially random,
but are in fact fully determined. They are determined, however, in a way that does not
permit these systems to be predicted with any reasonable degree of success, but, more
importantly, does not allow us to go backwards in time from the present to guess
about what previous states of the system may have been like. What makes the
investigations of these chaotic systems most interesting to the human scientist is that
time can only go one way in these complex systems: There is no way back; there is
only many ways forward. If history and society are chaotic in the sense that these
models suggest, then there is in fact no necessary pattern to history. Knowing history,
then, will not in the least prevent us from making the same mistakes; but, more
encouragingly, it will also not limit us to the same conditions in which mistakes can
ever be the 'same' mistakes.
Under these conditions, then, of fuzzy categories, soft concepts and chaos, it is the
work of culture to make sense — to give reality some edges. A great deal of this
making of sense is the making of political order, and making political order is making
distinctions. Thus, social groups and social categories are distinguished by boundaries
that the symbolic order of society creates to do just this job. The mechanism of
boundary-making itself are central to the system, and can not be at its 'edges'. This is
because it is precisely these edges — or boundaries — that it creates. Political
boundaries, cultural boundaries and social boundaries-exist because there is a means
for 'making' them in the minds of people who live by and in terms of them, and
because we must impose an order, however fictional it may be, in order to live with,
through and for each other.
We now live at a juncture of time in which the familiar edges that the whole
twentieth century worked so hard to make, have begun to erode like limestone
cathedrals in acid rain. As the old edges lose their definition, we see new patterns
emerging out of the softer forms of the weathered ro.ck. To extend the metaphor, one
of these appears to be democracy. I think there are a good reasons for this that are not
directly related to the politics of democracy or to any other system for apportioning
and regulating power. Democracy is different from systems of power that rule through
fear or patronage, or systems that rule through hierarchical orders sanctioned by
religion. These are political orders that Ernest Gellner, in a sweeping account of
human political history from hunters and gatherers to the post-modern condition, calls
'Agraria' and 'Industria'. Democracy can only exist in societies where fear, hierarchy
and patronage have become optional, or have been limited to such a degree that they
cannot destroy democracy. It is clear, however, that democracy is not itself a means of
government. It is only a means for selecting a type of government, and for making
those with power responsible to those whom they rule. The critics of democracy have
always pointed out that 'the people' can be wrong. Plato rejected democracy for
precisely this reason: ordinary people can not be expected to know what is good for
them. They might, either in fear or in naive trust, elect tyrants to rule them. People,
especially "The People",, needed philosopher kings to rule them because they could
not be trusted with democracy r The democratic processes after the French and
Russian revolutions proved Plato correct in this one respect: the people could not
always be trusted to elect just or good rulers, and democracy itself did not necessarily
provide a just means of government. Democracy, it turned out, is simply a means for
summing up and giving form to something that could be called the collective will, or
just the 'majority'. In fact, modem democracies are just 'numbers games' that create
complex fictions of political will. These fictions of political will can be exercised by
bureaucracies or by tyrants, by oligarchs or patriarchs, . . . and even buffoons. It is
undeniable that the present years in South Africa constitute a new departure, and that
democracy is 'the way to go.' But democracy is not the 'end of history,' as Francis
Fukuyama has called it after the fall of the Berlin Wall. If the philosopher Georg Hegel
had been right about the inevitable realization of the Sprit of World History as the
unfolding of human freedom, then Fukuyama would be right in seeing democracy as
the end of history. But Hegel was wrong, because history does not work like that, and
so is Fukuyama. Democracy in fact, can not be a system of political power. Instead it
is a method for deciding in an inevitably chaotic and temporal world who shall be
deemed to have power, and over whom and with what limits. In other words,
democracy is a method and a discourse, not a political system of government;
alternatively, we can say that it is a political system but only inasmuch as it defines the
terms of discourse about power. Power exists outside of democracy which can only
choose, under certain conditions, what form it will take.
It is natural, then, that democracy could emerge in times of flux and uncertainty
about what power is, and who wields it over whom. South Africa, curiously, has
reached a democratic moment because the certainties that Apartheid attempted to
create have failed. It has emerged into a field of discourse where everything seems
open and fresh, new for discovery as the New South Africa.
III. Boundaries: resources and discourses
During South Africa's first democratic elections from 26 to 29 April, 1994,1 traveled
with my family to observe the process in the eastern Transvaal (now the Northern
Transvaal province) in the area around Hoedspruit and Timbavati. Hoedspruit is a tiny
farming town that also services the air force base located nearby. It is the centre of a
strong White right-wing contingent of the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging. As we
entered the town, we could see the prominent posters for Constand Viljoen, the leader
of the Volks Front party. Even more prominent was the sign at the outskirts that said
' Welkom in cms Valksstaat' (Welcome to our Folk-state). Signs like this one have
appeared all over the Transvaal, and signal the unofficial and unilateral 'declaration of
independence' by some small 'White' towns in the Transvaal and Orange Free State.
My daughter was puzzled, and asked what it meant. Her mother explained that some
people in the town wanted an old Apartheid-style Whites only town, and that the sign
was an attempt to show that they meant business. She was then even more puzzled
since there were no White people in sight, and she exclaimed, 'But there are only
Black people here!' My son interjected, 'Well, that's the story of South Africa.'
On the surface the sign looked like the 'Welcome to our Town' signs that civic-
minded Rotarians or Chambers of Commerce erect at the edges of their, towns in the
interests of'good business' On the outskirts of Hoedspruit the sign both proclaimed
and disguised a complex political fantasy, its apparent innocence as camouflage for
desperation. Later on, members of the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging did assemble in
a 'show of strength' to attempt to keep Black voters from the polling stations that had
been set up in the town. They were dressed in their Khaki uniforms with black and red
Nazi-like insignia — uniforms that are an odd blend of the Colonial British bush-attire
for rural administrators, with school-boy shortpants, and badges indirectly reminiscent
of German National-socialist insignia. The insignia are composed around the Biblical,
apocalyptic symbolism of the number 7, but they look like dyslexic swastikas or
strange modernist re-arrangements of one of the most disturbing symbols of twentieth
century nationalism. They evoke images of genocide without directly referring to it,
and denote for their followers a yearning for the end of the world which, somehow,
must also be their own re-beginning in a promised land. By combining the biblical
symbolism of the Apocalypse — three sevens — with the colours and sprung format of
German National Socialism from the middle of this century, these end-of-the-century
activists seemed to placed themselves at the 'end of history'. Ironically, they did so on
the eve of {he birth of the New South Africa. This is a precarious place from which to
launch a new 'Volksstaat'. When the end of the vote-count showed that the ANC had
won by an astonishing majority, the precariousness and ambiguity of their position
seemed extreme. But the AWB members of Hoedspruit have a great deal to tell us
about the nature of power, and the way that these communities attempt to explain
power to themselves, now that its exercise seems so fraught with complexity and
uncertainty. .
Their uniforms assemble elements of past conflicts arid past armies that had been,
ambiguously, both friends and enemies to the Afrikaner people. Photographs show
Boer commandos of the last century, and those who fought during the South African
War of 1899-1902, wearing corduroy trousers and woolen jackets, velskoene (home-
made hide shoes), and banded felt hats. Though they imagine that they are the
contemporary embodiment of the old Boer armed levies, the uniforms of today's AWB
'Wencommandos' show little trace of an historical knowledge or a conscious attempt
to recreate the past. The elaborate reconstruction of the 'Great Trek' in 1938 by those
Afrikaners who did deliberately use the images of the past in order to recruit a loyal
and dedicated following, show that such historical reconstruction of clothing is a
possible option for the Afrikaner politician.. This, however, is not what is happening
today. The AWB uniforms appear to draw more inspiration from the military aesthetic
of security firms and the plethora of commando movies. They are a stagy pastiche of
the colonial and the anti-colonial.' Above all, they exemplify the aesthetics of violence,
the act of bloodletting and dressing up for the kill. The costume of the killer —
Schwarzeneger (the actor) in armour or Schwartzkopf (the US General) in
camouflage, the jumped up flight-lieutenant as president-for-life or the home-made
'freedom fighter' — is today both entertainment and the emblem of high political
seriousness, and thus they display a sense of the tragic and the comic, the African bush
and the Hollywood soundstage together. Above all, they display the boundary — the
boundary of political identity, the boundary of an era, the boundary of a certain African
style and disposition. Both playfulness and seriousness are evoked at the edges of
time, custom and place that are farthest from the mundane. Behind the men of the
AWB was the sign-boards at the edge of a kind of madness saying—to us, outside
observers as they do to themselves — here, and no further: "Welcome to the
Volkstaat'. .
In 1932, Jan Smuts, the ex-Boer General, international diplomat and philosopher of
holism, remarked that Africans were 'not ready for polities'. This may still be true
today, but it is equally true that the Afrikaners of the AWB have forgotten what
politics they might once have known. Can groups of people, some who have yet to
discover politics, and others who have forgotten it, re-create a polity? Unfortunately,
many lack the resources to do so. The AWB lack the resource of their own histories,
as do many of the Black Africans that surround them. Education had long since lapsed
into indoctrination or had, for Blacks, ceased to exist as a viable institution. Lacking
the resources for a genuine recourse to history, they must all return to a common point
of mythical origin in this land, from this land, within this land. In other words, they
have resorted to different versions of the myth of autochthony. All over the lowveld
towns before the election, the posters of Constand Viljoen, leader of the Volks Front
Party were pasted side by side with those of Zulu Chief Minister Gatsha Buthelezi who
demanded a Kingdom for his king, as emblem of the genuine Africa. These were
different versions of a similar story that each could at least understand as the other told
it. ... ,...
Elsewhere such competing claims to the earth and to traditions could only end in
bloodshed. In the lowveld, this time, and in this South Africa, everything went
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smoothly. The AWB men at Hoedspruit had been moved from their roadblocks by the
police, quickly and without incident. Nevertheless, the anomalies and anxieties that
underlie the declaration of a White 'folk state' are built on cobbled-together political
myths of domination and 'the land', enacted in uniforms that might just as well have
been a post-modern artists 'statement' had they not invented them for themselves, on
borders that they wished were enforceable and carried out in a roughneck, 'boorish'
style. The AWB men of the lowveld were aggressive, but it seemed to arise from
disappointment, yearning, rage and confusion rather than any purity of will, clarity of
purpose, or folkish solidarity, though these sentiments may also be part of the complex
mix.
A few tens of kilometers away from the town of Hoedspruit, a colleague, Isak Niehaus
has been conducting ethnographic fieldwork in the regions straddled by the
'homelands' of Gazankulu and Lebowa, one for the Tsonga (or Shangaan) people; the
other for the 'North Sotho' (people who have recently and somewhat mysteriously
become the 'Pedi'). The indecision about their 'tribal' name is chronic, long-standing
and symptomatic of the interchanges and ambiguities of identity in the whole region. It
was one of the grand aims within the smallness of Apartheid thinking, of course, that
such ambiguities could, and should, be cleared up. People, it was thought, should at
least know who they are. So a boundary was drawn between the Sotho (or Pedi)
people, on the one hand, and the Shangaan (or Tsonga) people on the other. Since,
unlike the Zulu, they had no names for themselves, they were given names for their
newly created foundling-states, Lebowa and Gazankulu, each vaguely reminiscent of
past kingdoms, Golden Ages and the glories of bloodshed, but again, slightly skewed.
The reference to the Gaza kingdom, in the name Gazankulu, 'Great Gaza', for
instance, refers to a conquest state in southern Mozambique, not Transvaal, and not
within the memory or historical knowledge of any of the ostensible 'tribes' who could
not, in any case, agree on a name for themselves. In any case the boundaries were
drawn. Just outside of the little town of Acomhoek, the railway line runs along this
border. One day while my anthropological colleague, Sakkie Niehaus, and a young
Shangaan friend were walking along it, the boy declared proudly that he and his friends
stood on this railway line that had become the boundary between the new 'States', in
order to throw stones at the boys in Lebowa. Sakkie asked him, 'But why do you
throw stones at them?' 'No, Sakkie,' the boy replied, 'I didn't have a gun.' Lacking
resources of history as well as violence, the boy's acts were reduced to play along the
fenceline.
In each of these cases — what we might call symptoms rather than cases — fantasies
of 'power' occur on the boundaries. But what are these boundaries? The railway line
today is now just a railway line, and there is no Volkstaat, notwithstanding the sign
that welcomed us to it. Lebowa and Gazankulu have apparently disappeared. They
still exist on maps, and in government gazettes, and indeed will persist far longer in the
formal and informal practices of bureaucrats, farmers, traders arid travelers. The
Volkstaat of the AWB has never existed, but its power to recruit followers seems to
emerge out of the future as a trace in the present, just as the many boundaries of the
past still continue to recruit shadowy allegiances to them. The imagination of the polity
in the lowveld has shifted. New provinces have been created. Old ones are
unceremoniously discarded. Those who were once enemies have become . . . if not
friends, at least common citizens of a country wracked by the ghosts of boundaries.
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A. Towards an aesthetics and metaphysics of power
The boundaries of South Africa, whether signaled by khaki uniforms or bureaucratic
knowledges and practices are strangely evanescent and yet enduring. They have a
presence that makes them stand for themselves. While there is a vast literature on
nations, nation-states, The State, ethnicity, and identity, most African countries today
are countries, not nations, states or ethnic groups. By 'countries' I mean named areas
of land demarcated by international boundaries, but not necessarily possessing
comprehensive state apparatuses, full administrative or fiscal coverage of the area so
named, or even a coherent self-identity as such. Seen as such, most of Africa is
countries, not nations or nation-states. Countries seem to exist as a form of
nominalism: they are named therefore they are. They are named because they have
boundaries. This is as true for the poorest of them as it is for the most powerful. At
some point in the histories of these bits of earth, they acquired boundaries. South
Africa, for instance carries a purely geographic name denoting the southern portion of
a continent. Its shape is the result of a history of bureaucratic decisions that might
have been otherwise: Lesotho (Basotholand) Botswana (Bechuanaland) and Swaziland
might all have been part of it, while Zululand or Transkei (Kaffraria) was not, or some
might have and others not. Other combinations and exclusions were possible. In the
end, it is simply as it is: a country within its borders. Actual borders are often
determined by factors that have little to do with any real political process: the course
of rivers, how far a horse can be ridden, the location of pass, how far a surveyor can
see, magnetic variations, illegible or imaginative treaties implemented by guess-work,
where one frightened army happened to catch up with another, and so on. These are
the events in the histories of countries^ It is otherwise for nations. Countries are
distinguished from nations, tribes and ethnic groups by the kinds of narratives that
define them, and by the rhetoric which evoke them.
All post-colonial countries in Africa have recognized, and stated in the OAU charter
that their borders, would be maintained even though they are consequences of
geographic happenstance and rarely reflect real ethnic, social or linguistic boundaries
on the ground. (It is an open question whether this is a good or a bad thing.) A few
have changed their names, but none have willingly changed their borders. They can not
be justified functionally, socially or politically. In order that they be taken seriously,
governments must refer, again anomalously, to a 'tradition' which everyone knows is
recent, not of African origin, and often in conflict with the 'nationalist' policies of the
governments that are associated with them.
South Africa's borders, similarly, are arbitrary, but to the historical arbitrariness of its
external borders is added the many internal borders within South Africa between
provinces (the four old ones and the ten new ones), administrative districts (so-called
development regions), the recent nominally-independent homelands (e.g. Venda,
Bophuthatswana) and the dependent but self-governing homelands (e.g. KwaZulu),
less recently, the 'group areas' of Grand Apartheid, the townships, farms, urban areas,
suburbs and central business districts, national parks, state lands (some mandated by
Queen Victoria!), military preserves, communal tribal lands, Black-owned free-hold
tenure lands, and many other types of areas and lands. Now, there are the phantom
boundaries of recently 'absorbed' previously independent or self-governing
'homelands' that are cross-cut the new, not yet implemented boundaries of the ten
newly declared provinces whose borders have, again, been decided arbitrarily by
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committees in Pretoria. All of these boundaries raise questions about who is 'inside'
(and inside what) and who is 'outside', who is an enemy and who is a friend, who is a
citizen, a 'home-boy', a permanent resident or a refugee, a native, a settler, an African,
a South African, and so on. Like the OAU charter that specifies the inviolability of
Africa's largely arbitrary boundaries, South Africa today is faced with a problem of
boundaries that are both widely recognized as arbitrary and without function, but also
considered 'sacred'. Virtually all of them cross-cut others, and divide the country into
many different kinds of units without either hierarchical order, such as the Napoleonic
rationalization of the French country-side into departments and prefects, or a
consistent and regular 'tiling' of the terrain with 'counties' as in England. Nor are they
consistent with the demarcation of Europe's landmass into 'countries', or the precise
jigsaw puzzle of US state boundaries.
There is almost no boundary in South Africa that is not haunted by the ghosts of
borders-past. A good example is the broad contested region between the Sundays
River and the Kei River, still called The Border region' in English, with bars, rugby
teams, and hotels so named. The region was complex1 from the very beginnings of
recorded history. White settlement began at the Sundays River in the late 1760s and
proceeded with frequent redefinition of the border to the Fish River in 1778 (Bergh
and Visagie 1985). Within this Eastern Cape Frontier zone boundaries shifted
continually between Dutch speaking, German and English speaking settlers and
transhumant cattle farmers among the Whites, and the Gcaleka, Ngqika, Ndlambe,
Gwali, Dange, Ntinde, Gqunukhwebe and others, including the Mfengu, composed
largely of factions from the Hlubi, Bhele and Zizi who had been driven into the Xhosa
region of the Cape frontier zone in the aftermath of Shaka's consolidation of the Zulu
kingdom. Boundaries continued to shift and incorporate more and more of the frontier
in the Cape colony until, in 1856, the remainder of the region was swallowed up by the
Colony as a 'humanitarian' measure by the governor Sir George Grey after the
collapse of Xhosa independence in the wake of the failed prophesy of Nongqawuse.
Nongqawuse a young girhwho saw visions of beautiful cattle and the ancestors of the
Xhosa people rising again from the river, ultimately convinced the Xhosa paramount,
Sarhili, that his people must bum their crops and kill their cattle in preparation for a
great rebirth in. which the Whites would be driven from the land. Instead, the Xhosa,
as a consequence of this appealing fantasy of power, starved to death in great numbers,
and thus weakened, were incorporated easily into the Cape. The frontier shifted by
degrees, through failed prophecies, informal agreements and abrogated treaties, but
each step left an historical trace of boundaries that can still be perceived today, not so
much on theground, but in the beliefs and practices of people who live there. The
Cape Frontier is the beginning of the Great Trek and the African National Congress.
It is a powerful generator of discourse on boundaries.
The South African boundaries £re complex, but more than this they are not mere
edges: they are themselves thejfocus of attention and identity. Today, these aesthetics
and metaphysics of boundaries1 are under pressure in the changing South Africa.
Boundaries are being manipulated 'rationally' by governing committees of well-
intentioned people, but traditional values, practicalities, practices and habits all attach
to the previous and long-standing multiple boundaries and borders. Current political
and constitutional debates focus on boundaries-how they are to be created, or
destroyed, and how they may attract or repel allegiances-in the New South Africa.
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Boundaries themselves have a salience that surpasses the merely practical. They are
both political problem and political solution. They are entailed by the exercise of
power, but undermine power and make possible the escape from it. The politics of
boundaries, and the boundaries of the political, and of the political community, all
combine in South Africa to create a discourse that goes well beyond the political to the
meta-political.
IV. Identities: consequences or prime movers?
I want to explore then, whether the relationship between boundaries and identities
that we frequently take for granted can not be inverted: it is often boundaries that
create identities rather than the other way round.
The literature on identities — national, nationalist, racial and racist, ethnic, and so
on — assume the naturalness of identity, that it is constructed, or primordial, but
always there. It is identities that create boundaries around the nations, ethnicities or
tribes that are somehow already there. It is usually taken for granted that it is the
concept of the nation, the ethnicity, the tribe that we must explain, not the boundaries
which are usually understood as the practical consequence of their mere being or
coming into being, like the epidermis of the political organism, the hide of the
Leviathan.
It may be, then, that in countries like South Africa, or in regions like southern Africa,
or even most of the rest of Africa, boundaries create identities.
A. Identities and boundaries
Boundaries are created and maintained by what amounts to ritual or gaming:
passports, mileposts, yellow lines painted across the road, electric fences like the one
between South Africa and Mozambique, are all more or less elaborate charades meant
to convince the person on the spot of the transcendent and enforceable 'truth' of maps.
Very few, if any boundaries are actually negotiated on the ground by people who might
be concerned. Boundaries of the modern sort are arbitrary, not boundaries of conquest
or treaty. As such boundaries are like death: they are sudden ruptures in social space,
as death is a rupture in social time, and they must be made sense of. The formation of
'identities' is one way to do this.
Like the so-called 'Holy Land', now Israel/Palestine, it is as if the conflict was not so
much about who got what, as about how and why. These struggles of the Border
lands are struggles over who gets to be the 'nation of Israel', and who 'the Pharaoh',
who is 'chosen by god' and who not. But more than this struggle over whose narrative
will prevail is the struggle over whose map will prevail. The truism that 'a map of
country is not the country' applies, but the country, unlike the nation, religious or
ethnic group, can not exist without a map. Nations, religious groups and ethnic groups
are held together by their texts, their master narratives of origin, common descent
and/or transcendence through suffering. Countries are held together by maps. Unlike
verbal texts, the referential truth of maps can be enforced and permanently enacted.
Texts represent evanescent speech; maps represent enduring landscapes. The
aesthetics of the map is visual and direct, that of text, aural and imagined. The
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mapped boundaries of countries, 'homelands', regions or townships can quickly
become symbols and metaphors of all other kinds of boundaries and forms of
difference. It is precisely this that was the dark and powerful logic of Apartheid.
Without geographical consistency or historical stability, the problem of boundaries is
not merely a geographic practice of surveying, marking, patrolling, establishing
customs posts, and so on, but there is also a constant and often anxious discussion of
boundaries, what we shall call, in addition to a practice of boundaries —. that is, the
surveying and recording, the planting of markers and border posts, that makes them
what they are — there is also a intense discourse of boundaries that dwells upon their
very nature. Any exercise of power must depend on the successful demarcation of
boundaries ofa political community or a national territory, and on .their representation
in text, wood, stone and steel. Of course,.the aesthetics of theseportrayals is
important: the colour of the border-guards jackets, the powerful almost magical
aesthetics of the rubber stamp on the crested page by which the world has sometimes
been ruled, the extraordinary claim to truth that each coloured map makes. The way
in which people respond to them in historical and ethnographic contexts suggest that
there is a significant aesthetic component to boundaries and their various
representations that goes well beyond what coercion and custom can account for.
Maps mark boundaries, but more than that they are pictures of imaginary shapes and
patterns that seem to reveal the natural shape of the country. Countries are these
boundaries, these shapes, and their very shapes compel consent and allegiance. This is
surely an aesthetic judgment.
Unlike Europe's countries, for instance, Africa's countries exist because of their
boundaries and not vice versa! The same is true of many divisions in South Africa
today. Boundaries, however, both make possible certain kinds of transactions and
prohibit others. Theft, chicane, corruption, refugees and refugee 'problems', 'external'
guerrilla bases and 'internal' political opposition movements are all made possible by
boundaries, however arbitrary. Around these develop considerable economic and
political interests that seek to maintain them.. In time, deeply held emotional
attachments and identities may also arise (and of course have done so). On the other
hand, boundaries also limit access to trade, to education and other social and material
resources; they make available to political recruiters (to whatever cause or party) the
valuable resource of.the external threat of the 'enemy' outside, and make possible an
imagined community of'friends' within.
B. Cross-cutting identities and the integrity of polity
South African identities cross-cut each other in multiple ways and in multiple
contexts. There is no fundamental identity that any South African clings to in common
with all, or even most other South Africans. South Africans have multiple identities in
multiple contexts, depending on factors of expedience, recruitment and mobilization,
and the company one keeps. In many similar multi-cultural countries or 'hetero-
nationalist' states, the same condition applies. In South Africa, however, South
Africans have multiple identities in common contexts, and common identities in
multiple contexts. A person might be a Zulu, or an Afrikaner, or a Jew in a context of
a common political party — perhaps the National Party, the Inkatha Freedom party or
the ANC. All of the major parties, for instance, are now multi-racial (or 'non-racial'),
and see this as a powerful source of political strength. A Muslim, or a Coloured, may
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span many religious, political, social and cultural contexts and thus link them together
into a social universe. These identities, then, can be said to be multiply cross-cutting,
in that, each overlaps a range of contexts, or a common context or institution may
contain many identities within it. On the other hand, these differences are also seen as
the principle source of conflict in South Africa. The motivation for Apartheid was to
prevent — in the mechanical metaphors of the time — 'friction' between the races and
nations, since racial difference caused 'friction' between 'race groups', and this caused
'heat', that is, violence. Political commentators and the public today blame political
violence on 'tribal', 'cultural' and 'racial' differences.
It is one of the fundamental ironies of South Africa that the endemic conflict that
characterized South African history, and that continues today, is the source of both
stability and disintegration. This is the compelling insight of Max Gluckman, one of a
number of anthropologists like Monica (Hunter) and Godfrey Wilson, Isaac Schapera,
and Meyer Fortes whose anthropological vision was largely shaped by the South
African experience. Indeed, the 'South African experience' has been written directly
into the history of anthropology itself. Malinowskian anthropology looked for the
order in the whole, the function of each part in making society 'run so smoothly'
(Malinowski 1926). In contrast to Malinowski, indeed in direct and conscious critique
of the Malinowskian vision, Gluckman believed that conflict was itself a mode of
integration. South Africa has puzzled all observers, including both Max Gluckman and
Malinowski, by its apparent surfeit of boundaries across which conflict could erupt. It
has always seemed that South Africa was on the brink of political and cultural
collapse. For the people of South Africa, the sense that somehow it could never work,
yet somehow must work, has been pervasive, a constant sense of suspense. The
extremes of this manifest in Apocalyptic visions of bloodbaths believed by the political
fringe and retailed worldwide by the press. For the anthropologist, like Gluckman it
presented a fundamental challenge to the theoretical basis of his discipline, but he
argued that it was through conflict itself that societies maintained their coherence, and
the rituals of inversions, or courts of law channeled and directed conflict in ways that
led to the maintenance of social stability overall. In his essay on the 'social situation in
modern Zululand', Gluckman described boundaries as being at the centre of the
'situation', defining interactions between missionaries, Zulu commoners, chiefs and
kings, and the various agents of the Colonial state. He understood the management of
conflict rather than maintenance of order to be the centre of the political process; ritual
played a central role by inverting, masking and mystifying conflict.
Persons are intricately involved with the. same sets of fellows in varied
systems of purposive activity. Cross-cutting allegiances and processes of
internal development within sets of relation establish ambivalence and
conflict within each group. Ritual cloaks the fundamental disharmonies of
social structure by affirming major loyalties to be beyond question.
(Gluckman 1965: 265),
Thus, Gluckman believed that conflict was itself a form of integration. Certainly, his
experience of South Africa must have seemed to confirm this for him, and he
generalized it as a principle of political order and stability. But applied to many of the
world's conflicts, Gluckman's formulation rings false or naive. In most instances of
serious conflict, violence, coercion and other consequences of conflicting aims and
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claims destroys the polity. Indeed, what seems to have made South Africa unusual is
precisely its resilience in the face of long-term endemic conflict. Parties to these
conflicts have somehow failed consistently to achieve their ends while southern African
society has apparently evolved towards greater and greater political and economic
integration while maintaining consistently high levels of violence. Why?
The answer lies in the pervasive 'cross-cutting allegiances' which are both
persuasive and permeable, and the ambivalence and ambiguity that they give rise to.
Gluckman speaks of the success or failure of conflict itself. The answer to his
perplexity, however, lies in the domain of complexities-and contradictions of cultural
identities more than it does in the success or failure of political processes. South
African identities have never polarized sufficiently to permit-devastating conflict. They
are either too fragmented, or too solid to permit the sort of bi-polar conflict that would
destroy it. With the exception of the Boer War, in which an external Imperial power
was directed against the independent Boer states, internal conflict has always stabilized
not as a balance of power, but rather as an impotent confusion. This is not a model of
conflict as integration, but rather integration through the consistent failure of any single
conflict to mobilize two, and only two, sides.. It is the very complexity of all possible .
allegiances, together with the fact that maintaining multiple identities and cross-cutting
allegiances has remained possible that helps to make South African uniquely stable and
violent at the same time. The factions of Zululand, the gangs of the East Rand, or
APLA cadres respond violently to conflicts inherent in the South Africa social
structure, but they never recruit a sufficient following to effect genuine change. This
has been true as much for Mkhonto we Sizwe and Apia (armed wings of the ANC and
PAC) as it is true of the South African Defense force, and the mysteriously-sponsored
so-called 'third force' of agent provocateurs and violent spoilers.
V. Countries: Failed nationalisms?
On May 9, 1994, Nelson Mandela addressed the people of South Africa on the
occasion of the opening of the new Parliament. He did not speak of 'The People' or
the 'nation'. As he stood on the balcony of the Cape Town City Hall with the majestic
Table Mountain as his backdrop, he pointed to the landscape on Which the 'beginning
of the fateful convergence' of Black and White had begun. If nations are, as Benedict
Anderson has argued, 'imagined communities,' then countries are imagined geometries
of landscape. .• South; Africa, the country, is a geometry for conflict and
accommodation, but above all it is a landscape. Looking out over the Bay to Robben
Island on the horizon, he spoke of his own imprisonment and subsequent freedom.
With a few gestures to the landscape, he thus summed up over 350 years of history as
one might sum up the shape of jelly by pointing to its container.
In the modern theory of nation states, it is the existence of nations that justifies the
existence of states. This was claimed by Hegel, who wished to justify the right of
Prussia to conquer the other German speaking states, and to create a unified master
state. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel's theory has become home
truth, and is not less strong today. Nevertheless, countries — especially South Africa,
and those like it — can not be justified by the nations they purportedly contain since
they do not contain nations but heteroglot and heteroethnic congeries of peoples. The
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appeal to nationalism made by the National Party on the basis of an Afrikaner, a Boer
or White nation, has failed. The claim to nationalism made by the African National
Party is likely to fail as well in so far, and if, it continued to pursue a 'nationalist1
agenda. Countries require other grounds —and Nelson Mandela seems to have
grasped this implicitly.
If politics is the art of the possible, then possibilities for legitimacy include the
appeal to the earth itself, to the aesthetics of landscape, the native (in the sense 'one
born in'), and to autochthony.
Failing nations, then, the land is sacred. But land in South Africa is an ambiguous
resource, regarded with ambivalence. There is, in fact, very little independent and
economically successful agriculture in South Africa, and most of what there is
restricted to a tiny fraction of the country. There is virtually no commercial agriculture
in any of the demarcated homelands. The so-called White farms produce the
overwhelming bulk of the agricultural product, but most of them are fully mortgaged
and could not continue to exist without massive government subsidization. In the face
of this, however, it is the land to which appeal is made on all sides. Both White and
Black people who call themselves Africans identify with the land, and claim it as their
inalienable right. Both appeal to the blood that has been spilt on it, the dead that have
been buried in it, the food that can be coaxed from it, and again and again, the beauty
of it. The aesthetic beauty of the landscape is thus a political resource. The migrant
dreams of it while he is in the mine, and waits to return to his land in the country-side
somewhere. In the case of the South African land, aesthetic is power.
A. Names and models
South Africans constantly refer to the beauty of their land, and it is this more than
any other single feature that seems to define what is common among the diversity.
South Africa is a country that does not have a name for itself, but simply calls itself
after the part of the continent that it sits on, the south end of Africa.
For years, discussion of South Africa has focused on the conflict between 'White'
and 'Blacks', and on the domination of one by the other. The terms of this conflict are
direct and simple, too simple. Perhaps the more powerful, and most powerfully
problematic conflict in South Africa is the perplexing logic of identity that lies behind
this. It is a country in which two nations both call themselves by the same name,
Africans/Afrikaans, yet see each other alternatively as mortal enemies and sons of the
same soil. They compete not just for land, but for autochthony, the transcendent moral
right to be of the land, not merely on the land. The politics of this cultural struggle
transcends mere politics. 'Afrikaner', of course, simply means 'African', 'a person of
Africa' in Afrikaans, a language whose name for itself means simply 'the African
language' (die Afrikaanse taal). This language is spoken by two groups, one 'White'--
people who call themselves Afrikaners, 'Africans', Boere, 'farmers' or Blankes,
'white-skins'- and another brown or so-called Coloureds, or Kleurlinge group of
people who identity more or less fully with Africa and with the Afrikaans culture.
On the other hand, the so-called 'Blacks' span a similarly large range of colours, but
are distinguished by broadly similar languages of the Bantu family and broadly similar
cultural beliefs and practices. Prior to their integration into South Africa, & process of
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incorporation and accommodation that went on for three hundred years from 1652
(on the Cape Peninsula) to the early 1950s (in the far eastern Transvaal).
Independently of what Nelson Mandela called the 'fateful convergence,' African social
relations led with few exceptions to fission and separation, not consolidation and
integration. In order to form anation, and have access to its goods, Black South"'
Africans have had to adopt and accommodate to political concepts and practices that
were originally European, while Whites have had to develop cultural concepts of
allegiance to the land the landscape and to a permanent identity in Africa. This
presents both with opposite sides of the same problem: how to be 'European' in an
African landscape, and how to be African in a Europeanized polity. These are not
problems that can be solved by any amount of violence — for all human communities
violence inevitably intensifies a commitment to locale and to the earth in which the
dead are buried. They are not problems that can be solved by the exercise of'power'
short of extermination. They are, in a sense, pure cultural problems. For both people
who call themselves Africans, the cultural solution has been sought through their
appeal to the ground, the country itself, not as the territory of a nation, but as the
terrain mapped out by arbitrary boundaries. These boundaries, and the landscapes they
contain become themselves the emblems of identity and the focus of allegiance.
B. City-states and their hinterlands
South Africa is a country stretched as thin as a sheet over three points of power and
wealth. These points, sprawling African conglomerations of villages, towns, malls,
superhighways and dirt tracks,^  business districts, industrial parks, townships, hostels,
squatter settlement, suburbs, small-holdings, farms, gardens, parks, public arenas and
no-go areas, amount to city-states, not just cities. They are Johannesburg in the
central northern inland region, Durban on the east coast and Cape Town on the west
coast. There are 3 or four lesser centres, but for the most part the three main cities are
all that matter. They mark the space around them and dominate their own hinterlands
which look to them with desire and anticipation, and loathing and disdain. They are
metropolises with bright lights and sources of darkest sin, they are cities and saviours,
hell-holes and minepits, harbours and havens or killing-grounds and places of no
return. South African rural sprawl that covers large parts of the hinterlands of these,
cities is scarcely distinguishable from them on many formal grounds of sociological
measurement since it's poor have no hope of scraping a living out of the soil that is
often as hard as parking lots, and yet as beloved as the graves of ones ancestors, the.
promised lands. The violenceiof the villages far from the vast city states respond as
little to the grand ideas of republic. There is no farm in the hinterlands that is
independent of the capital and administrative control of the city-states that command
them, and none that can claim'to inspire the idyll of authentic subsistence from the
earth and sun, yet there is none that can claim to be entirely immune to the hope that
the earth will support its children. The city, not by contrast, but in sympathy, nurses its
own spasms of violence and hopelessness. The city-state of Johannesburg, is in its
turn, like a rural placev Only ojne train track passes through it, there are no busses that
completely connect it, and people hurry through it going to other places within it and
beyond it. Johannesburg and its. hinterlands have names, many names, but no maps.
The maps can not keep up with the change. These are places where local knowledge is
the best arid only guide. Maps show the main roads named for dead architects of
Apartheid: Malan, Verwoerd, Strydom, and statesmen like Jan Smuts and Louis Botha,
A
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but the real geography of Johannesburg lies in the routes to schools, the secluded
prayer spots in the rough bush all over the city, the Portuguese cafes, the sellers of
used furniture, fruit and mielie meal. It is like a forest in which only the denizens of the
many eco-zones know its mysterious resources.
The city states of South Africa each have their own identities and allegiances. This
fact has been implicitly recognized by creating one province out of the area around
Johannesburg. No one has come up yet with a proper name since it is not recognized
as the city-state that it is, but it is referred to by the geometry of several of its main
landmarks, Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeneging, or just 'The PWV*. There is no
inherent logic or native land, no nation whose supposed territory this is. It is defined
by the density and focus of its population, and by their commitment to it as a
geographical focus. Johannesburg is a young city and one that can claim
autochthonous origin. It sits atop the countless deep galleries of the mines that
brought it into being, like the crown of a giant African termite mound. Underground,
the rock is still dug and pulverized to extract the gold and other minerals that it
contains. The city exists here for no other reason. It is rooted in the hollow chambers
created by a century of mining. This in itself is a kind of autochthony.
To think of South Africa as a constellation of city states avoids the long-ingrained
habit of trying to imagine it as a centralized nation on the European model of the
'nation state' led from Paris, London, Rome or Berlin. The Niccolo Machiavelli of
The Discourses is more appropriate as an analyst of South Africa than the Karl Marx
of Capital The princes and peasants, the palaces and countryside of Macchiavelli are
far more similar to the intricacies of the real South African country, than the banks and
steam-engines of Karl Marx's London when compared with city-state and hinterland
structure of the South Africa landscape. Above all, the countryside is important.
C. Autochthony
Inseparable from the countryside, however, is the politics of chiefs and kings. This
dimension of South African politics is probably least understood of all — in part
because of the inappropriateness of the models that have been applied. It is well-
known, of course that the Chief Minister of the Kingdom of the Zulu, and President of
the Inkatha Freedom Party, Chief Gatsha Mangosotho Buthelezi, is directly descended
from Shaka, the founder of the Zulu state. His insistence that room be made for'
permanent recognition of the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelethini, nearly
wrecked the elections. Nelson Mandela, however, is also of chiefly lineage. He
renounced the chiefship long ago when he chose the path of the ANC, and it is difficult
to say how important this may once have been in securing his original power base
among the Xhosa and the educated elites who founded the ANC and who were then its
members. It is of little significance now, except that it links him, perhaps ambiguously,
to one of the most powerful sources of legitimization in South Africa.
The chiefs and the so-called traditional authorities in South Africa are ambiguous.
Indeed, the 'traditional taw' of chiefs and kings has been defined by both the formal
state bureaucracy and by the followers of the chiefs, as somehow outside of politics.
Indeed, the power of traditional authorities, and the power of politics seem
incommensurable, For many, especially rural South Africans, the authority of the city-
states, and the authority of the chiefs are parallel and different. They may function,
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relative to each other, as points of external reference, as alternative or ultimate courts
of appeal. In any case, they offer the individual an escape or alternative recourse: the
chief may defend one from the state bureaucracy, while the apparatuses of the
bureaucratic state may also act as an escape from 'tradition' and the chief where this is
necessary — for instance in cases of witchcraft accusation, or where Christians may
wish to avoid circumcision. The bureaucratic institutions of the city-states and the
chiefs are as similar and as dissimilar as the games of .draughts (American 'checkers')
and chess. Despite the apparent similarity of the games, draughts can not be played
with chess men, nor can chess be played with draughts pieces. In the first case,
draughts pieces are not sufficiently differentiated to carry the semantic distinction of
chess; on the other hand, the shapes of chessmen make it mechanically impossible to
play draughts because they can not be stacked. The two games are not merely
incompatible, but are incommensurable; it is not just a difference of rules, but a
difference of fundamental properties. Similarly, chiefs can not be integrated into the
politics of parliament because of the different grounds on which their authority rests.
Chiefs still control access to land and control the initiation'schools and 'tradition'.
Thus any appeal to an African tradition, and to autochthony depends on the existence
of chiefs. Any real practice of power in the modern sphere of parliamentary politics,
however, must contradict and.undermine the power of chiefs. They stand at the
intersection of practical logic of administration, and the meaningfulness and legitimacy
of the African identity and origin. . . . . . . .
Chief Minister Buthelezi's attempt to negotiate a place for King Goodwill
Zwelethini in the domain of politics was disruptive and potentially fatal. It was a kind
of resistance-politics brinkmanship of holding out to the last possible moment. But
more than this, it was a brinkmanship game on the boundary between autochthony and
bureaucracy. The king could not be part of parliamentary politics without undermining
the nature and basis of his authority, but could not remain entirely outside of it without
disrupting the legitimacy of the entire system, especially for the large number of Zulu
royalists. The compromise that was reached, however, leave room for many more
'kings' and traditional chiefs to emerge and play an increasingly larger, perhaps parallel
role, withing the broader field of social power in South Africa. ;
'Politics' is still not seen as a universal contest in which all possible forms of power
are disposed. Rather, 'politics' is a restricted domain of the exercise of particular
forms of power for most South Africans. Witches, chiefs, kings, ancestors, God,
prophets and doctors all are held to exercise other, different powers. To carrythe
weight of 'polities', and to bring the legitimacy of the genuine African-ness of its
exercise, the chiefs have remained outside of politics. Recognizing this, Smuts' remark
that Africans were not ready for politics rather missed the nature of this dual politics,
or rather the differentiation of the polity into the modern and traditional.
From the view of the Afrikaners, especially those represented by the secessionist
AWB and Volksfront, the land is theirs by another logic, the logic of production and
utility. It is nonetheless a claim to the land, not just as resource but as mythical origin
and primordial right. In this light, it is easy to understand that surprising alliance
between the 'traditional' politics of both the 'White' right-wing and the Zulu chief
minister. Both necessarily resorted to the identity giving power of the land, and the
landscape, and appealed in their different ways to a pure African-ness.
21
VI. Politics and Meta-Politics:
The key to South African politics then is that it is not just politics at all. All politics,
they say, is local politics. This is true where politics concerns itself with the legitimate
exercise of power and with control over the distribution of scarce resources, or over
the behaviour of the members of the polity. This is what we usually mean by normal
politics As such, all normal politics is, from the outside, essentially boring. By
contrast, South African politics is not boring. This is because it is not merely local. In
. fact it is a politics about politics, a meta-politics.
South African politics has constantly attempted to explicate and examine the
grounds of its very being. This is a politics which has not been able to take for granted
the nature or number of its primary actors. It is a politics that seeks not merely to
distribute power, or to acquire or maintain power, but to define the nature of power
itself. Many different political visions contend with one another in the political arena;
even the limits and nature of the arena itself are questioned and tested. A universal
politics in which all persons are the primary units has only just been achieved, this late
in the twentieth century. . - ;
A. The transition to 'Transition' from Apocalypse
When Captain James Cook came to South Africa on his way to his fatal impact with
the Hawaiians, he noted the constant tension that seemed to exist between the 'races',
the English and Boers, the White and the Hottentots. He gave the Colony just 20
years before, he thought, it would end in bloody violence. At the end of thel980s it
seemed that Captain Cook had been off by a precise factor or ten, that is, it had taken
200 years to dissolve into a bloodbath, not the 20 that he had then thought. Now, it
seems he must have been just plain wrong.
For most of its history the sense of the end of history, the coming of bloody and
final conflict, has characterized South Africa's view of its own history. It is still the
central element of the political vision of the many in the White right wing, and of the
some Black ultra-nationalists of the PAC and its allies. It is a vision of a 'rolling
apocalypse' in which the predicted end is only just put off by another war, another
proclamation, another bomb, by segregation, by Apartheid, by the end of Apartheid, by
'one settler, one bullet', and now by elections. Everyone now feels that South Africa
is 'in transition.' But South Africa is not simply in 'transition' to a final state, or to
some other 'end of history'. To be successful, it must remain in a sort of. permanent
transition. Like Trotsky's idea of a permanent revolution', South Africa seems likely
to remain in permanent transition, just as it once seemed to exist perpetually just ahead
of Apocalypse. It is important to maintain this sense of transition since there can be no
end to history in South Africa that is not also apocalyptic. That much is correct about
the baleful visions of the racists of all colours and persuasions. But history does not
end. This is a post-modern condition, and the ability and willingness to recognize it is
a sign of a new kind of political maturity.
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